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NOT YOUR GRANDPARENTS’ INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: HOW 
RIGHTSHOLDERS ARE USING LICENSE AGREEMENTS TO 
AVOID EXHAUSTION AND ENSURE THEIR PRODUCTS STAY OUT 
OF THE SECONDARY MARKET 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Exposé of the Issue 
I spent the better part of a Saturday morning last spring helping my 
grandfather assemble his new computer, as good grandchildren do.1 We 
proceeded without complication before beginning the task of downloading the 
software. While we waited for Microsoft Office software programs to install, a 
digital box inquired whether “the user” agreed to the terms and conditions of 
Microsoft’s license agreement to use its software. As my cursor made its way 
toward “yes,” my grandfather asked a question that caught my attention: “Why 
is there a license agreement? I thought I purchased everything I needed.” 
Sympathetic to his confusion, I explained that he did in fact “purchase” 
Microsoft Office programs, which in this case really meant he paid for 
permission to use the programs, rather than outright ownership of them, such as 
the ability to share or re-sell. 
His genuine curiosity about the means by which businesses buy and sell 
products in the digital age had me wondering about the extent to which the scope 
of intellectual property has changed in the United States since first written into 
the Constitution.2 In the not-so distant past, it was a luxury simply to have a 
private phone line – literally a wire – attached to one’s house to avoid sharing 
phone lines with the neighbors. And so too the means for selling products 
covered by intellectual property were primitive: only physical, tangible products 
exchanged hands in sales transactions.  
Clearly there have been some advancements in the way life is lived and 
information is shared, as evidenced by tweets, snaps, texts, pins, vlogs, blurbs, 
and #tbt vines. The technological landscape fast outpaces the United States’ 
system of lumbering jurisprudence. Where do the limitations placed on the scope 
of intellectual property in the physical world come into play in the digital world? 
Large industries that own creative content are moving toward license 
 
 1. Please do not contact the author for computer assistance. 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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agreements, rather than selling their products outright.3 This system is not 
inherently wrong. In fact, it is rather enterprising to stretch the power of 
intellectual property, although this practice never fails to surprise consumers 
who otherwise thought they had outright ownership of products they purchase.  
The future of intellectual property in the digital age looks to blur the lines 
between what is a sale and what is a license. The consumer must ask: “Did I 
really ‘buy’ anything at all, or did I merely agree to licensing terms in exchange 
for the right to use it?” 
B. Intellectual Property 
The existence of intellectual property4 itself, including its nature and scope, 
defines how a government justifies granting property rights in useful or creative 
information in exchange for the public disclosure of that information.5 Every 
modern developed country in the world has some system of limited monopolies 
in exchange for the public disclosure of technological and creative 
advancement.6  
Generally, patents grant limited monopolies in exchange for disclosures of 
new and useful technologies, and copyrights provide similar monopolies in 
exchange for creative works in an attempt to stir the pot of culture, art, film, and 
music. Granting legal monopolies for any reason should require an answer to the 
important question of how to draw boundaries around such powerful exclusive 
rights. It serves neither economic nor moral interests to grant inventors and 
artists unfettered control over their works within the given lifespan of their 
patents or copyrights.7 Fortunately, as will be discussed within this article, there 
are indeed limitations on the scope of intellectual property rightsholders’ 
 
 3. For example, instead of selling books by first printing onto discrete bindings of pages and 
distributing them for sale, companies are digitizing their content and simply granting access as a 
license agreement, significantly restricting rights the “buyer” would otherwise have. See Conditions 
of Use, AMAZON https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=508088 
[https://perma.cc/W3WD-Q3GD] (last visited May 21, 2018). 
 4. Intellectual property here is meant to encompass patents, copyrights, and trademarks. 
Trade secrets often fall within the definition of intellectual property, but will not be discussed within 
the scope of this article. The general doctrine of trademark exhaustion falls outside the scope of 
this article as well. See generally 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
19.8 (4th ed. 2017). 
 5. The astute reader will wonder what effect if an economic researcher proved that patent or 
copyright systems actually hindered “advancements” in innovation or creative works! 
 6. See Daniel R. Cahoy, Oasis or Mirage?: Efficient Breach as a Relief to the Burden of 
Contractual Recapture of Patent and Copyright Limitations, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 135, 138 
(2003). 
 7. The standard lifespan of a U.S. patent is twenty years from the date of its initial filing. See 
35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012). The lifespan of a U.S. copyright is the life of the author plus seventy 
years. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). Whether these lifespans themselves serve any economic 
interest is best left untouched by the author. 
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exclusive abilities to control their inventions and works once sold.8 How such 
limitations will affect the market and how intellectual property rightsholders will 
react to these changes is yet to be determined.  
The doctrine of limitation on patented and copyrighted goods sold into the 
market is commonly referred to as exhaustion, or the first-sale doctrine.9 
Variations in scope of this limitation reflect the balance of power between the 
artist (or inventor) and society.10 The nature of intellectual property is quid pro 
quo between people and government. Advancing societies often thrive off the 
reliable output of new technologies and art, while enterprising inventors and 
authors almost certainly want compensation for their efforts expended on 
creative endeavors.  
C. The Secondary Market 
The secondary market is a broad term that captures many concepts, but this 
article generally defines transactions involving products that have passed outside 
original intellectual property rightsholders’ control.11 These transactions often 
include other related concepts such as parallel imports and gray markets, 
although those transactions tend to encompass importation and international 
trade, specifically.12 Limitations placed on control over products once they fall 
outside the scope of intellectual property protection creates such secondary 
markets, which may have unintended economic consequences. Further, exactly 
how intellectual property rightsholders will choose to transact works and 
inventions that fall outside the scope of intellectual property protection is yet to 
be seen. This article argues that such rightsholders are likely to fill the void left 
by international intellectual property exhaustion with license agreements.13  
 
 8. See infra p. 8. The exhaustion doctrine for trademarks is treated differently than for patents 
and copyrights, due to the nature of trademarks themselves. 
 9. These terms are interchangeable, although commonly referred to as exhaustion within 
patent law and the first-sale doctrine within copyright law. 
 10. “The [Progress] Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation 
and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts.” Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 
141, 147 (1989) (noting the Progress Clause contains both a grant of power and set of limitations 
upon that power). 
 11. See R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. 
REV. 577, 586 (2003). 
 12. Chung-Lun Shen, Intellectual Property Rights and International Free Trade: New 
Jurisprudence of International Exhaustion Doctrine under the Traditional Legal System, 7 J. INT’L 
COM. L. & TECH. 176, 181 (2012). 
 13. See infra p. 24. 
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This article will analyze the Supreme Court’s framework in deciding 
Kirtsaeng14 and Lexmark,15 anticipate the likely effects on the secondary market, 
and then predict how intellectual property rightsholders will likely attempt to 
enforce their rights moving into the future. My analysis will look into arguments 
both for and against intellectual property exhaustion, ranging from greater 
market freedom and the prevention of economic stagnation at the whim of 
intellectual property rightsholders, to penalizing low-income countries and 
destabilizing local markets.  
Part I of this article will introduce a general overview of copyright and patent 
laws in the United States.16 Part II will describe the evolution of the first-sale 
doctrine within United States copyright law until the 2013 Supreme Court case, 
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.17 Part III will similarly describe the 
evolution of exhaustion within United States patent law until the 2017 Supreme 
Court case, Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc.18 Part IV will 
expand upon the general principles of economic theories related to secondary 
markets, and will discuss how international intellectual property exhaustion 
within the United States may positively — and negatively — affect these 
secondary markets.19 Finally, Part V will analyze the current state of how 
intellectual property rightsholders may actually decide to deal with international 
exhaustion, what steps they likely can take to protect their intellectual property, 
and the likelihood those steps will be successful.20 
I.  OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAWS 
Congressional enactment of copyright and patent legislation derives from 
the “Progress Clause” of the Constitution, which grants to Congress express 
power over these areas of intellectual property.21 It is fairly accepted that the 
first term in each of the “pairings” within the Progress Clause refers to copyright 
law. Thus, the Progress Clause can be turned into the Copyright Clause by 
reading “to promote the Progress of Science22 … by securing for limited Times 
to Authors … the exclusive Right to their … Writings.” The second term in each 
 
 14. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 554 (2013). 
 15. Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1523, 1526-28 (2017). These 
decisions placed the United States economy under the purview of international exhaustion. 
 16. See infra pp. 5-8. 
 17. Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 519; see infra pp. 8-13. 
 18. Lexmark, 137 S.Ct. at 1523; see infra pp. 13-16. 
 19. See infra pp. 17-24. 
 20. See infra pp. 24-33. 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8: The Congress shall have power “to promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 958 (C.C.P.A. 1979). 
 22. Back in the day, “science” meant knowledge. See generally WILLIAM STANLEY JEVONS, 
ELEMENTARY LESSONS IN LOGIC 7 (1870). 
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of the “pairings” within the Progress Clause refers to patent law. Thus, with an 
equal touch of linguistic magic, the Progress Clause turns into the Patent Clause 
by reading “to promote the Progress of … Useful Arts,23 by securing for limited 
Times to … Inventors the exclusive Right to their … Discoveries.” 
Exactly how a federal patent and copyright system would fit into the 
Constitution was the subject of debate among the delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention in 1787.24 The delegates certainly wanted to avoid the inter-state 
conflicts that were already happening among competing inventors and states.25 
The Patent and Copyright Acts, written into law even before other fundamental 
institutions of United States democracy like the Bill of Rights, serve to highlight 
the apparent need for uniform intellectual property protections across the 
states.26  
United States copyright law can be traced back to the British Statute of 
Anne, which had a heavy influence on the Copyright Act of 1790.27 Striking 
similarity between these pieces of legislation is not surprising, given the United 
States’ trend of simply adopting British common law and statutory law during 
that era.28 There was an understandable sentiment during the agrarian Colonial 
Era that protection of copyrighted works did not deserve high colonial priority, 
thus states were encouraged to enact their own legislation to protect the works 
of their citizens.29 At the passage of the Copyright Act of 1790, authors were 
granted limited monopolies of fourteen years for the exclusive right to publish 
and vend “maps, charts and books,” being renewable for a second fourteen-year 
term if the author was still alive at the time of renewal.30 United States copyright 
protection has grown substantially since 1790 and now protects a much broader 
range of creative works for the life of the author, plus seventy years.31  
 
 23. At that time, “arts” meant trade, skill, or profession. Id. 
 24. MAX FARRAND, 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 505-06 (1911). 
 25. Even George Washington acknowledged the importance of intellectual property protection 
in his State of the Union address to Congress in 1790: “The advancement of agriculture, commerce, 
and manufactures, by all proper means, will not, I trust, need recommendation; but I cannot forebear 
intimating to you the expediency of giving effectual encouragement, as well to the introduction of 
new and useful inventions from abroad, as to the exertions of skill and genius of producing them at 
home.” Annals of Congress, 1st Cong., 2d Sess., I, 932-33. 
 26. See KENNETH W. DOBYNS, THE PATENT OFFICE PONY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY 
PATENT OFFICE 18 (1994). 
 27. Oren Bracha, The Adventures of the Statute of Anne in the Land of Unlimited Possibilities: 
The Life of a Legal Transplant, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1427, 1428 (2010); see also, Statute of 
Anne, 8 ANN., c. 19 (1710) (Gr. Brit.). 
 28. Bracha, supra note 27, at 1428. 
 29. Id. at 1440. 
 30. PETER K. YU, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: COPYRIGHT AND 
RELATED RIGHTS 143 (2007). 
 31. See 17 U.S.C. § 302. 
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The Third Act of the First Congress was the enactment of the Patent Act of 
1790,32 which granted a limited monopoly of fourteen years to any inventor who 
“hath … invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, 
or device, or any improvement therein not before known or used.”33 As the first 
Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson was the driving force behind the creation 
of federal policies regarding a national patent system for the United States.34 
Even today, United States patent laws are remarkably similar to their origins, 
offering patent protection to “whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof.”35 
Under modern United States law, the general power of copyright ownership 
is the ability to exclude all others from reproduction, distribution, public display, 
public performance, or otherwise copying a creative work if such work is 
deemed a sufficiently original work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression.36 Modern United States law grants patent owners similar exclusive 
rights to exclude all others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or 
importing the patented invention once the government has deemed the invention 
sufficiently new, useful, and nonobvious to merit protection.37 Despite these 
exclusive powers, there are recognized limitations on the intellectual property 
rightsholder’s power of exclusion over a copyrighted or patented product once 
it is sold. When there is an authorized sale of a copyrighted work or a patented 
work, such monopoly as provided by means of intellectual property protection 
is exhausted as to that particular sold work.38  
II.  THE FIRST-SALE DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES: BEFORE AND AFTER 
KIRTSAENG 
Much of the same logical framework that applies to the copyright first-sale 
doctrine applies equally to the patent exhaustion doctrine.39 The historical 
 
 32. Bonito Boats, 409 U.S. at 147. 
 33. 1 STAT. 109, 110 (1790). 
 34. 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 406–08 (1904). 
 35. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 36. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) for the exclusive rights of the copyright owner. See also 17 
U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) for the requirements to acquire copyright protection at the time of the work’s 
creation. 
 37. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) for the exclusive rights of the patent owner. See also 35 
U.S.C. § 101 for the utility requirement, 35 U.S.C. § 102 for the novelty requirement, and 35 U.S.C. 
§ 103 (2012) for the nonobviousness requirement of patent law. 
 38. 5-16 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03 (2018). 
 39. The first-sale doctrine under United States copyright law, while not identical to patent 
exhaustion, relies on similar theoretical principles. Guy A. Rub, Rebalancing Copyright 
Exhaustion, 64 EMORY L.J. 741, 754 n.53 (2015). 
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developments that led each one toward international exhaustion are important in 
their own right. 
A. The First-Sale Doctrine 
The exclusive distribution right of a copyright owner differs from his other 
exclusive rights in the sense that those other rights involve copying in some 
way.40 It would be anomalous if the copyright owner could extend his monopoly 
to cover unauthorized sales of copies once they were lawfully sold.41 Once there 
is a lawful sale of the copyrighted work, the policy of protecting the copyright 
monopoly gives way to the policy of promoting free trade and commerce within 
a free market.42 
The first-sale doctrine under United States copyright law traces back to 
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,43 when the Supreme Court construed the exclusive 
right to vend as applicable only to the initial sale of that copyrighted good, absent 
any contractual provisions to the contrary.44 The Court held the right to vend 
was extinguished upon lawful sale to the customer.45 This was the first 
application of the first-sale doctrine within United States law,46 and the first time 
the court dealt with the intersection of the competing interests between 
copyright, contract, and licensing.47 
Since that time, the first-sale doctrine has formally been codified into federal 
law.48 The Copyright Act49 expressly states: “Notwithstanding the provisions of 
Section § 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made 
under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the 
authority of the copyright owner, to sell, or otherwise dispose of the possession 
of that copy or phonorecord.”50 Technical terminology more accurate than “first 
sale” would be “first authorized disposition by which title passes.”51 The 
 
 40. 2 MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.12 (2017). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. In Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Supreme Court stated the 
purpose of protecting the exclusive rights of authors is to incentivize creativity “and to allow the 
public access to the products of genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.” 
464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). The ultimate goal of the Copyright Act is for the good of the public 
consumer. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 151-52 (1975). 
 43. 210 U.S. 339, 343 (1908). 
 44. Id. at 348. 
 45. Id. at 344. 
 46. 4 WILLIAM PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 13.19 (2014). 
 47. Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350 (“There is no claim in this case of contract limitation, nor 
license agreement controlling the subsequent sales of the book.”). 
 48. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). 
 49. For a general treatment of the Copyright Act’s evolution over the years, see MARSHALL 
LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW (4th ed. 2005). 
 50. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
 51. NIMMER, supra note 40. 
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appropriate inquiry is whether (1) the physical product was manufactured under 
the authorization of the copyright owner, (2) whether that particular copy of the 
physical copy was transferred under the authority of the copyright owner, (3) 
whether the defendant qualifies as the lawful owner of that particular copy, and 
(4) whether the defendant disposed of that copy by sale or other means, rather 
than make a reproduction.52 
In 1998, the Supreme Court heard Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza 
Research Int’l., Inc.,53 where it decided the issue of whether goods manufactured 
within the United States, subsequently exported and sold abroad, then finally 
imported back into the United States and sold by another distributor, were 
subject to the original copyright owner’s exclusive right of importation under 17 
U.S.C. § 602(a),54 or whether such goods were excluded by the first-sale 
doctrine under 17 U.S.C. §109(a).55 The Court, referring back to precedent set 
by Bobbs-Merrill, held the first-sale doctrine did apply to domestically produced 
copyrighted works sold abroad and then imported back into the United States.56 
The Court held that because § 109 is a limitation on the exclusive rights of § 
106, then it is also a limit on those importation rights within § 602(a).57 Justice 
Stevens, as the author of the majority opinion, commented on the purpose of § 
109, writing “the whole point of the first-sale doctrine is that once the copyright 
owner places a copyrighted item in the stream of commerce by selling it, he has 
exhausted his exclusive statutory right to control its distribution.”58 However, 
this holding extended only to goods manufactured within the United States, and 
then purchased abroad.59 The Court did not reach the issue of whether the first-
sale doctrine applied to items manufactured abroad.60 
 
 52. UMG Records, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F.Supp.2d 1055, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2008), affirmed, 
628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 53. 523 U.S. 135 (1998). 
 54. “Importation into the United States, without the authority of the owner of copyright under 
this title, of copies … of a work that have been acquired outside the United States is an infringement 
of the exclusive right to distribute copies … under section 106.” 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (2012). 
 55. The owner of a particular copyrighted work may sell or otherwise dispose of such 
copyrighted work without the permission from the copyright owner of the original work. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 109(a). 
 56. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 152; see also, David Tseng, Bypassed: The Kirtsaeng Decision’s 
Underwhelming Impact on Exhaustion, 43 AIPLA Q.J. 559, 564 (2015). 
 57. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 143. 
 58. Id. at 152. 
 59. Id. 
 60. The Supreme Court’s lack of a decision on this issue in Quality King left the topic open to 
confusion and debate within the lower courts. In 2008, the Ninth Circuit held in Omega S.A. v. 
Costco Wholesale Corp. that § 109(a) applied only to items manufactured within the United States. 
541 F.3d 982, 983 (9th Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but the Ninth Circuit’s 
ruling was upheld by the Court’s 4-4 decision. See NIMMER, supra note 40, at § 8.13. 
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B. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (2013) 
The controlling case for the first-sale doctrine under United States copyright 
law is Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.61 In anticipation of his move from 
Thailand to the United States to begin his studies in mathematics, Mr. Supap 
Kirtsaeng asked his friends and family to buy cheaper versions of his English 
textbooks in foreign shops, then ship those books to him once he was in the 
United States.62 When he was finished with the textbooks, he re-sold them at the 
higher United States market rates and kept the profit for himself.63 As the 
copyright owner of the textbooks, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. sued Kirtsaeng, 
basing its lawsuit on the “unauthorized importation and re-sale of books” as an 
infringement of the prohibition against imports.64 Kirtsaeng argued that his 
books were lawfully made and acquired, and that the § 109(a) first-sale doctrine 
allowed him to import and re-sell the copyrighted books without permission.65 
The Supreme Court agreed with Kirtsaeng, holding the first-sale doctrine 
under § 109(a) does apply to copyrighted goods sold abroad and then brought 
into the United States.66 The Court said this case presented a similar issue to the 
one decided in Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc.,67 
where § 602(a)(1)’s reference to § 106(3)’s exclusive distribution right 
incorporates the first-sale doctrine of § 109(a).68 The difference here was that 
the copies were manufactured abroad.  
The critical words in § 109(a) that decided the legal issue here were 
“lawfully made under this title.”69 The Supreme Court held there is no 
geographic limitation imposed on the first-sale doctrine based on § 109(a)’s 
language, context, and common law history of copyright law.70 By adopting this 
position, the Court extended the interpretation of the first-sale doctrine to include 
items manufactured in foreign countries and essentially abrogated the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Omega.71 The Court reasoned that Congress intended the 
Copyright Act to reach the works of citizens of treaty nations, even those 
manufactured abroad, and that it simply did not make sense to read a geographic 
 
 61. 568 U.S. 519 (2013). 
 62. Id. at 525. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 526. 
 65. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (The owner of a particular copyrighted work may sell or otherwise 
dispose of such copyrighted work without the permission from the copyright owner of the original 
work). 
 66. Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 524-25. 
 67. 523 U.S. 137. 
 68. Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 524. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 529. 
 71. 541 F.3d at 989. 
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limitation into the statutory language of the first-sale doctrine.72 A geographic 
limitation would unduly restrict the right to dispose of lawfully purchased 
property whichever way the consumer sees fit, which defied the original creation 
of the copyright laws for the benefit of the public good.73 
Acknowledging this ruling brought United States copyright law under the 
umbrella of international exhaustion, the Kirtsaeng Court, quoting Lord Coke 
from 1628, emphasized its belief in the importance of allowing buyers of goods 
the freedom to compete in the market,74 and that the history of American law 
generally promotes competition and freedom of sale as advantageous to the 
consumer.75 The Court also went on to express a lengthy list of all the industries 
that would suffer under a regime of restricted copyright exhaustion, including 
libraries, technology companies, retailers of foreign goods, and art museums.76 
The Court made this decision fully aware of the economic impact that an 
international first-sale doctrine would have on copyright owners.77  
III.  THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES: BEFORE AND AFTER 
LEXMARK 
A. The Exhaustion Doctrine 
In the 1873 case Adams v. Burke,78 the Supreme Court first acknowledged 
the patent exhaustion doctrine by recognizing there were no territorial 
boundaries on the purchaser’s right to use a patented invention once he had made 
a lawful and authorized purchase.79 In Adams, the purchaser of a patented coffin 
lid had taken the lid for his own use outside the ten-mile radius of Boston, which 
was expressly forbidden by the patent owner.80 The Supreme Court wrote: “The 
 
 72. Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 540. 
 73. Alex N. Rosenblum, Comment, Wiley’s First Sale Folly: The Irrelevance of Location of 
Manufacture When Raising a First-Sale Defense, 19 SW. J. INT’L LAW 231, 246 (2012). 
 74. Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 539. 
 75. Id. (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 
(2007)). 
 76. Id. at 544. 
 77. “A publisher may find it more difficult to charge different prices for the same book in 
different geographic markets … we can find no basic principle of copyright law that suggests that 
publishers are especially entitled to such rights.” Id. at 552. Justice Ginsburg dissented, arguing 
that Congress had intended to provide copyright owners with protections against imports of foreign-
made copies of their copyrighted works. Id. at 557. Ginsburg fully adopted the philosophy that 
intellectual property is territorial in nature and should allow for intellectual property rightsholders 
to possess “parallel rights” under the laws of different nations. Id. at 573 (citing Vincent Chiappetta, 
The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS, International IRP Exhaustion and a 
Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 333, 340-41 (2000)). 
 78. 84 U.S. 453 (1873). 
 79. Id. at 456. 
 80. Id. 
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patentee … having in the act of sale received all the royalty or consideration 
which he claims for the use of his invention in that particular machine or 
instrument, it is open to the use of the purchaser without further restriction on 
account of the monopoly of the patentees.”81 
Then, in the 1894 case Keeler v. Standard Folding-Bed Co.,82 the Supreme 
Court relied on Adams to determine that a purchaser could re-sell a patented 
invention he had purchased, just as he could use such patented invention without 
limitation, because the lawful and authorized purchase had freed him from the 
patent monopoly on these rights.83 The Court expressly stated that “one who 
buys patented articles of manufacture from one authorized to sell them. . . 
becomes possessed of an absolute property in such articles, unrestricted in time 
or place.”84 The Supreme Court took these exhaustive concepts even further in 
1942 when it decided United States v. Univis Lens Co.,85 where it held the patent 
conferred no right for the patent owner to control the re-sale price of his 
invention by the subsequent purchaser’s sale.86 
In 2008, the Supreme Court heard Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, 
Inc.,87 where it held that patent exhaustion applies to the sale of components of 
a patented system that must be combined with additional components in order 
to practice the patented method.88 The court held that exhaustion does apply to 
method claims.89 Once the Quanta decision was handed down, there was much 
discussion whether Quanta undermined the decisions of Mallinckrodt v. 
Mediapart,90 where the Federal Circuit held there was no patent exhaustion 
accompanying conditional sales,91 and Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade 
Commission,92 where the Federal Circuit again held there was no patent 
exhaustion accompanying the first sale of a patented item made outside the 
United States.93 Despite the holding in Quanta, the holdings in Mallinckrodt and 
Jazz Photo were affirmed by the Federal Circuit case Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. 157 U.S. 659 (1894). 
 83. Id. at 663–64. 
 84. Id. at 659. 
 85. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942). 
 86. Id. at 250. 
 87. 553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
 88. Id. at 621 (“For over 150 years this Court has applied the doctrine of patent exhaustion to 
limit the patent rights that survive the initial authorized sale of a patented item.”). 
 89. Id. at 630. 
 90. 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 91. Id. at 709. 
 92. 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 93. Id. at 1098, 1111. 
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Impression Prods., Inc.94 in 2016, when the Federal Circuit held that 
Mallinckrodt and Jazz Photo were not undermined by Quanta.95 
B. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. (2017) 
In the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court looked 
at two issues at bar: whether a patented item sold under express restriction of the 
purchaser’s right to re-use or re-sell may be enforced, and whether patent 
exhaustion applies to items sold outside the United States and first purchased 
outside the United States.96 The Supreme Court’s ruling officially abrogated the 
holdings of Mallinckrodt with respect to domestic exhaustion,97 and Jazz Photo 
with respect to international exhaustion.98 The Supreme Court held “a patentee’s 
decision to sell a product exhausts all of its patent rights in that item, regardless 
of any restrictions the patentee purports to impose or the location of the sale.”99 
The Court focused its domestic exhaustion ruling on the reasoning that the 
purpose of patent law has been fulfilled once the patent owner has received 
compensation for the sale of his patented invention.100 The Court did hold that a 
patent owner may attempt to enforce restrictions on the use or sale of his 
patented invention through applicable doctrines of contract law, but that he may 
not do so under patent law because the sold invention has “passed outside of the 
patent monopoly.”101 
Next, the Court turned to the issue of whether patent exhaustion applies to 
inventions first purchased outside the United States, where the United States 
patent laws do not govern.102 The Court drew parallels to its recent 2013 decision 
in Kirtsaeng, where this issue was raised in the context of copyright law, already 
discussed in this article supra.103 The common law doctrines that originated both 
patent law and copyright law did not make geographic distinctions, therefore a 
straightforward application of the exhaustion doctrine required the conclusion 
that it applied overseas as well.104 In fact, the court explained the “historic 
kinship between patent law and copyright law” left no room for such a rift 
between the two regarding the issue of international exhaustion.105 
 
 94. 816 F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 95. Id. at 726–27. See also 5-16 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03 (2018). 
 96. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1523, 1529 (2017). 
 97. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 98. Jazz Photo Corp., 264 F.3d at 1111. 
 99. Lexmark, 137 S.Ct. at 1529. 
 100. Id. at 1532. 
 101. Id. at 1533. 
 102. Id. at 1535. 
 103. Id. at 1535–36; see generally Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 1351 (2013). 
 104. Lexmark, 137 S.Ct. at 1536; see also Kirtsaeng, 133 S.Ct. at 1363. 
 105. Lexmark, 137 S.Ct. at 1536. Justice Ginsburg dissented with respect to international patent 
exhaustion. She argued that patent law is territorial, and that the previous holding regarding 
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IV.  THE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXHAUSTION 
ON THE SECONDARY MARKET 
Exhaustion is at the crossroads between intellectual property, marketplace 
economics, and consumer benefits. Among the international community, the 
scope of the ability of an intellectual property rightsholder to control the 
importation of patented or copyrighted goods once those rights have been 
exhausted is still a controversial topic.106 No international agreement was 
reached within the TRIPS Agreement regarding control over the importation of 
legitimate goods once the intellectual property rights have been exhausted.107 
Goods imported and sold outside the control of the original rightsholder are 
commonly referred to as “parallel imports” or “grey market” goods.108 There is 
still no global consensus between different member states and countries 
regarding the appropriate level of intellectual property exhaustion.109 Three 
categories of exhaustion are practiced by different countries around the world: 
national, regional, and international.110 
A. How the Rest of the World Deals with Intellectual Property Exhaustion 
What is truly different between the exhaustion doctrines among countries is 
the scope of what is exhausted. Two questions must be asked: (1) What 
transactions trigger exhaustion, and (2) which exclusive rights are then narrowed 
as a result of exhaustion? Some countries, such as India, apply national 
exhaustion, whereby only domestic sales trigger exhaustion.111 Under national 
exhaustion, the intellectual property owner always retains exclusive rights 
regarding the importation of protected inventions or creative works that are first 
purchased abroad. Other countries, now including the United States after the 
2013 Kirtsaeng ruling and the 2017 Lexmark ruling, follow international 
exhaustion, whereby sales made anywhere in the world trigger exhaustion of the 
 
copyright exhaustion is not binding on patent exhaustion because the two “are not identical twins.” 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Id. at 1538. 
 106. See SUSY FRANKEL & DANIEL J. GERVAIS, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 114 (2016). 
 107. See Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS, 
International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 333, 334–35 (2000). 
 108. It should be noted that parallel trade does not refer to illegal activities or the trade of 
counterfeit goods. See Marianne Buckley, Comment, Looking Inward: Regional Parallel Trade as 
a Means of Bringing Affordable Drugs to Africa, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 625, 627 (2011). 
 109. See generally T. R. Swanson, Combating Gray Market Goods in a Global Market: 
Comparative Analysis of Intellectual Property Laws and Recommended Strategies, 22 HOUS. J. 
INT’L L. 327 (1999). 
 110. There is no global consensus on the appropriate level of intellectual property exhaustion. 
See Rub, supra note 39, at 751; see also Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights art. 6, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1867 U.N.T.S. 299; Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 28, 1979, S.Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986). 
 111. Rub, supra note 39, at 751. 
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intellectual property rightsholder’s exclusive rights.112 Finally, other 
jurisdictions follow regional exhaustion, which is the practice followed within 
the European Union, whereby any sale of a protected work within any member 
state of the European Union then triggers exhaustion of that product with respect 
to any other member state within the European Union.113 To illustrate the 
European Union’s case of regional exhaustion, a copyright owner could exercise 
exclusive rights of restrictions upon imports of his books first sold in the United 
States into Ireland, but not if those books were first sold in Spain.114  
Disharmonization regarding the treatment of exhaustion and imports has 
come under increasing scrutiny in recent years.115 Such inconsistencies between 
countries result in inefficiency and make worldwide consolidation of intellectual 
property laws and uniformity nearly impossible to achieve.116 
B. What Are Secondary Markets? 
The demand for goods remains steady in a healthy economy, regardless of 
how much intellectual property protection may cover those goods. The 
secondary market includes all goods and products sold outside of the control or 
desire of the original intellectual property rightsholder.117 The secondary market 
is important to understand when discussing the benefits and drawbacks between 
regimes of intellectual property exhaustion because it does not require much 
imagination to appreciate the interests that are at stake on either side of the 
argument for or against the secondary market: the rightsholders clearly want 
more control over their inventions and creative works, and consumers want the 
cheapest prices possible for goods they wish to buy. Therefore, an awareness of 
how the secondary market affects regional economies is as critical as it is 
controversial.  
In colloquial business parlance, “gray markets” and “gray businesses” are 
focused on selling genuine products by unauthorized means, most commonly 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.; see also Thomas N. Bart, Parallel Trade of Pharmaceuticals: A Review of Legal, 
Economic, and Political Aspects, 11 VALUE HEALTH 996, 998 (2008); J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD 
COPYRIGHT LAW § 9.06 (3d ed. 2008). 
 114. According to the World Intellectual Property Organization’s latest survey, twenty-seven 
countries followed national exhaustion, nineteen countries followed international exhaustion, 
twenty-two countries followed regional exhaustion, and another eight countries reported following 
a “mix” depending on the circumstances, or were uncertain which regime they followed. See WIPO 
Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Exhaustion of Patent Rights, 3 (Oct. 6, 2014). 
 115. CHRISTOPHER HEATH, PARALLEL IMPORTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 11 (1999), 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sme/en/atrip_gva_99/atrip_gva_99_6.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q 
8MA-QWWK] (presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Association for the 
Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (ATRIP) at the headquarters of 
WIPO in Geneva (July 7 to 9, 1999)). 
 116. Id. at 12. 
 117. Reese, supra note 11, at 586. 
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through online sites.118 Whenever there are profits to be made, distributors that 
operate within the secondary market are encouraged to fight for a percentage of 
those profits, often offering the consumers a better deal.119 Depending on the 
market, online gray market retailers may have cornered most, if not all, of the 
market.120 
C. Good and Bad Effects of the Secondary Market on the United States 
Economy 
International exhaustion creates several implications regarding the 
interaction between intellectual property rights and the secondary market.121 
International exhaustion will likely strengthen competition in the United 
States for higher quality products at lower, or at least more reasonable, prices.122 
The free competition of commerce has been understood historically as an 
important identity value within American economic philosophy and seems to be 
met with little opposition.123 The typical consumer enjoys the ability to compare 
prices between different desired products before making a final buying 
decision.124 In effect, a strong working secondary market forces the hand of 
intellectual property rightsholders to balance their prices with the competition 
of the secondary market, keeping prices reasonable for consumers. As a matter 
of common sense, international exhaustion works toward preventing market 
monopolies. Once the intellectual property rightsholder has established some 
form of market power, the market they have created for their exclusive product 
 
 118. Mike Ives, Dealers’ Online Sales Continue to Challenge Watch Brands, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
17, 2017,) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/17/style/watches-online-sales.html [https://perma.cc 
/3J98-68Y8]. This is not to be confused with the black market or other illegal goods, although the 
two concepts may intersect occasionally. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Victoria Gomelsky, Time to Sell Online?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.ny 
times.com/2017/03/23/fashion/watches-internet-sales.html [https://perma.cc/P3EY-ASJY]; see 
also Fritz Hahn, Why D.C.’s ‘Gray Market’ Is a Good Thing for Beer Lovers, WASH. POST (July 
5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/why-dcs-gray-market-is-a-good-thing-
for-beer-lovers/2015/07/05/95762f0e-2019-11e5-84d5-eb37ee8eaa61_story.html?utm_term=.924 
c63871998 [https://perma.cc/9CHL-8BPQ]. 
 121. Chung-Lun Shen, supra note 12, at 176 (“The international exhaustion doctrine is the 
optimal legal model for the harmonization goal through examining the theoretical arguments and 
observing legal experience in the global community.”). 
 122. Vincent Chiappetta, Patent Exhaustion: What’s It Good For?, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
1087, 1136 (2011) (arguing that empirical evidence shows a healthy secondary market will result 
in increased product quality and reduced prices). 
 123. Harvey E. Bale, Jr., The Conflicts Between Parallel Trade and Product Access and 
Innovation: The Case of Pharmaceutical, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 637 (1998). 
 124. Frederick M. Abbott, First Report to the Committee on International Trade Law of the 
International Law Association on the Subject of Parallel Importation, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 607, 612 
(1998). 
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will approach monopolization.125 With this power, prices are decided by the 
intellectual property rightsholder, opening the possibility for potentially 
exorbitant prices going well beyond ensuring compensation for creativity and 
innovation. International exhaustion may lead to lower prices in the secondary 
markets outside the control of the intellectual property rightsholder once those 
products are first sold, allowing for competition. At the very least, such 
secondary markets will eliminate the artificial monopoly created by the 
intellectual property rightsholder, which helps to resolve the abuse of market 
power. 
However, an analysis of international exhaustion must also deal with 
potential harmful effects on the economy as well. Efficient international 
marketing and business often involves altering prices based on the economic 
status and income levels of local populations.126 Such schemes typically charge 
higher prices in developed markets and lower prices in developing markets.127 
This practice of price discrimination makes sense as a means to take advantage 
of higher profits to compensate for possible losses in selling to low-income 
markets. However, in order to deal with international exhaustion where the 
producer can no longer control the exact pricing scheme in particular markets, 
sellers will likely follow a more uniform price, thus raising prices in low-income 
markets.128 It is easy to see the higher financial burden placed on low-income 
markets under this scheme. Regarding the pharmaceutical industry, many 
economists predict that companies will refuse to sell drugs at lower prices to 
low-income markets because those companies anticipate arbitrage and 
undercutting in those markets.129 Taken to the extreme, this would clearly spell 
disaster for vulnerable populations that desperately need medications, yet simply 
cannot afford the prices.  
An especially important point of consumer protection is that promotion of 
secondary markets often increases the uncertainty of product quality after initial 
sales. It is highly unlikely that products sold through secondary markets will 
come equipped with warranties or quality assurance contracts.130 Consumers 
will simply assume the risk of purchasing goods manufactured in foreign 
 
 125. SETH E. LIPNER, THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF GRAY MARKET GOODS 79-80 
(1990). 
 126. Carsten Fink, Entering the Jungle – The Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights and 
Parallel Imports, in COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 178 (Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 1999). 
 127. J.S. Chard & C.J. Mellor, Intellectual Property and Parallel Imports, 12 THE WORLD 
ECON. 69, 76 (1989). 
 128. David A. Malueg & Marius Schwartz, Parallel Imports, Demand Dispersion, and 
International Price Discrimination, 37 J. INT’L ECON. 167, 190 (1994). 
 129. Jennifer L. Graber, Excessive Pricing of Off-Patent Pharmaceuticals: Hatch It or 
Ratchet?, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1146, 1164 n.88 (2017). 
 130. Chard & Mellor, supra note 127, at 73. 
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markets with little familiarity with the quality of products made in those regions. 
Downstream distributors of patented or copyrighted products can easily take 
advantage of the goodwill or reputation built up by the original manufacturer’s 
investment in research and development, marketing, product testing, 
improvements, and advertising.131 This leads to market inefficiency when 
product creators know their investment will not yield the desired results. Some 
economists argue these effects of strong secondary markets will actually 
increase prices, thus hurting consumers, because manufacturers will be forced 
to make all their profits on the front end, at the initial purchase.132  
D. Why Stronger Secondary Markets are Beneficial to Consumers 
International exhaustion is more beneficial to the United States economy 
than it is harmful. Generally, territoriality as it relates to intellectual property 
exhaustion is an obstacle to free commerce.133 Territoriality has enjoyed 
powerful consideration historically but will face increasing obsolescence as 
innovation and technology drive consumers online.134 Online rights and online 
transactions are transforming economic interactions, where consideration of 
territoriality loses priority. The first-sale doctrine is slowly being applied to 
digital goods as well.135 The Court of Justice for the European Union has already 
held the first-sale doctrine applies to digital copies as well as physical copies.136 
Many copyright owners are digitizing and licensing their works online in 
response to online demand and as an alternate method to control their works.137  
 
 131. Robert J. Staaf, The Law and Economics of the International Gray Market: Quality 
Assurance, Free-Riding and Passing Off, 4 I.P.J. 191, 207-11 (1989). 
 132. Greg Dolin, Supreme Court’s Lexmark Patent Decision Will Harm Consumers, THE HILL 
(June 12, 2017), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-judiciary/337491-supreme-courts-lex 
mark-patent-decision-will-harm-consumers [https://perma.cc/T3J5-TUXK]. 
 133. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., THE RECASTING OF COPYRIGHT & RELATED RIGHTS FOR 
THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 218 (2006) (arguing the territorial nature of European intellectual 
property economic rights is an obstacle to creativity and allows for the compartmentalization of 
internal markets along geographic boundaries). 
 134. Physical location with respect to intellectual property exhaustion will become a matter of 
semantics in the digital age, where the country of origin will decrease in importance in otherwise 
entirely virtual transactions. 
 135. See John Villasenor, Rethinking a Digital First-Sale Doctrine in a Post-Kirtsaeng World: 
The Case for Caution, 2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L ANTITRUST CHRON., May 2013 at 1-4. 
 136. See Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., 2012 E.C.R. I-0000; see also 
Alice J. Won, Exhausted? Video Game Companies and the Battle Against Allowing the Resale of 
Software Licenses, 33 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 388, 393 (2013). 
 137. Brittany Greger, Comment, Consumer Rights Need a Reboot: The Supreme Court’s 
Decision in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. May Have Unintended Consequences for the 
First-Sale Doctrine and Consumers, 47 TEX. TECH L. REV. 275, 278 (2015). 
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Further, international exhaustion and the secondary market serve to protect 
consumers.138 This notion can be observed by exceptions to intellectual property 
rightsholders’ exclusive rights when countries can show necessity to protect 
human health and life, or to protect industrial or commercial property.139 The 
free competition of goods sold in the market should be ensured, even in areas 
where internal markets are favored.140 Globalization has created a smaller world 
wherein consumers want products from all over the world. National markets 
have become international ones, and by natural extension, this means national 
transport of goods has become international transport of goods.141 
The decisions in Kirtsaeng and Lexmark to limit the control that intellectual 
property rightsholders have over their products after initial sales serves as an 
indirect endorsement of the secondary market.142 Support of the secondary 
market benefits consumers within such markets.143 As will be discussed in the 
next section of this article, private contract provisions and licensing may still be 
viable means for intellectual property rightsholders to restrict trade of their 
goods.144 
V.  PRACTICAL WAYS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTSHOLDERS WILL 
ATTEMPT TO PROTECT THEIR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FROM EXHAUSTION 
The United States economy operating within international exhaustion raises 
several questions about how intellectual property rightsholders will attempt to 
assert control over their intellectual property. There are no binding statutes or 
case law that have squarely decided whether an intellectual property rightsholder 
 
 138. See Clark D. Asay, Kirtsaeng and the First-Sale Doctrine’s Digital Problem, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. 17, 22 (2013) (noting that copyright owners found ways to make money after the advent of 
the VCR, despite their initial arguments that such technology would impair their ability to generate 
revenue). 
 139. COMMISSION COMMUNICATIONS ON PARALLEL IMPORTS OF PROPRIETARY MEDICINAL 
PRODUCTS – FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, Press Release, EUR. COMM’N, MEMO/04/7 (Jan. 
19, 2004), europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-04-7_en.pdf. 
 140. See, e.g., Case C-44/01, Pippig Augenoptik v. Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft, 2003 E.C.R. 
I-3095 (“Parallel imports play an important role in preventing the compartmentalisation of national 
markets.”). 
 141. See Shubha Ghosh, Pills, Patents, and Power: State Creation of Gray Markets as a Limit 
on Patent Rights, 53 FLA. L. REV. 789, 814 (2001). 
 142. See Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court OKs Discounted Resale of ‘Gray Market’ Goods, 
NPR (Mar. 19, 2013, 3:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/03/19/174757355/ 
supreme-court-oks-discounted-resale-of-gray-market-goods [https://perma.cc/5VS6-LUSN]. 
 143. See Gary Shapiro, Supreme Court Gives American Consumers Victory over Copyright 
Owners in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, FORBES (Mar. 20, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites 
/garyshapiro/2013/03/20/supreme-court-gives-american-consumers-victory-over-copyright-own 
ers-in-kirtsaeng-vs-john-wiley-sons/#4d2dbff662b9 [https://perma.cc/7GQG-AGXW]. 
 144. Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, Parallel Trade in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry: Implications for Innovation, Consumer Welfare, and Health Policy, 10 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 185, 196 (1999). 
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may use a license agreement to maneuver around intellectual property 
limitations that would have gone into effect had there been a sale.145 This 
uncertainty in the law has not slowed the rapid pace by which companies have 
employed the use of license agreements, especially after the Supreme Court 
decided the issue of international exhaustion.  
It is this article’s argument that, unless and until the Supreme Court rules 
otherwise, intellectual property rightsholders will continue to use license 
agreements to keep products outside the secondary market.146 Further, this 
article will explain which steps intellectual property rightsholders may take to 
maximize the probability their license agreements will be enforced,147 and what 
effect this enforcement may have on damages.148  
A. How Common Are License Agreements? 
The practice of covering digital content with license agreements already 
pervades the marketplace.149 For example, Amazon licenses its digital content, 
and does not sell it.150 When a user downloads a book from Amazon, he has 
agreed to licensing agreements that do not allow for lending or re-sale.151 The 
current market continues to see an increase in demand for “streaming” and 
digital products, such as provided by YouTube, Spotify, iTunes, and Netflix.152 
Libraries are entering into more licensing agreements as books and content 
become digital.153 Shrinking budgets often mean libraries are forced to decide 
between maintaining payment of license fees for access to e-books, and offering 
 
 145. John P. Uetz, Note, The Same Song and Dance: F.B.T. Productions, LLC v. Aftermath 
Records and the Role of Licenses in the Digital Age of Copyright Law, 57 VILL. L. REV. 177, 191 
(2012). 
 146. See infra Section V.A. 
 147. See infra Section V.B. 
 148. See infra Section V.C. 
 149. Uetz, supra note 145, at 190. 
 150. See B.J. Ard, Confidentiality and the Problem of Third Parties: Protecting Reader Privacy 
in the Age of Intermediaries, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 42 (2013); see also Kindle License 
Agreement and Terms of Use, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/kindle/kcp/install.html?ie= 
UTF8&mobile=1&tou=1 [https://perma.cc/8NZW-GUJK] (last updated Oct. 7, 2017) (“Unless 
otherwise specified, Digital Content is licensed, not sold, to you by the Content Provider.”). 
 151. Amazon secured a patent on the re-sale of its digital content. U.S. Patent No. 8,364,595 
(filed May 5, 2009) (issued Jan. 29, 2013). 
 152. Rub, supra note 39, at 782. 
 153. See Rachel Ann Geist, Comment, A “License to Read”: The Effect of E-Books on 
Publishers, Libraries, and the First Sale Doctrine, 52 IDEA 63, 92 (2012) (arguing that under 
licensing regimes, libraries are stripped from owning their own content and are subject to 
publishers’ contractual restrictions and changing fees). 
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many of their other programs.154 Therefore, the practice of major companies in 
the mainstream marketplace is to move toward license agreements.  
B. Are License Agreements over Intellectual Property Actually Sales? 
Whether an intellectual property rightsholder can restrict a sale in some 
manner as to retain ownership rights remains an issue which is highly fact-
sensitive.155 After all, there must be a sale for there to be any “first sale” doctrine 
to apply in the first place. Savvy and enterprising intellectual property 
rightsholders, as they should, are going to look for ways to retain as many rights 
and as much control as possible. In the digital age, the leading way to avoid 
copyright and patent exhaustion is the license agreement.156 It is this article’s 
argument that intellectual property rightsholders will use licenses to their 
advantage, especially in the digital age, to avoid “sales” that would otherwise 
exhaustion their intellectual property rights. 
The Supreme Court left open potential doors for patent and copyright 
owners to retain control over their intellectual property, including contract laws 
structuring license agreements to restrict re-sale.157 Even so, there has not been 
enough case law to determine an answer to the question of how an intellectual 
property rightsholder can ensure that a license de jure does not turn into a sale 
de facto. And equally important to ask, how can the intellectual property 
rightsholder ensure such contracts or post-sale restrictions remain enforceable? 
With respect to the patent laws, Lexmark is clear: once there is a sale, patent 
infringement suits are no longer available for subsequent sales.158 However, 
licensing has become extremely common regarding software and digital content 
 
 154. Tim Spalding, E-Book Economics: Are Libraries Screwed?, LIBRARYTHING BLOG (Oct. 
7, 2009), http://www.librarything.com/blogs/thingology/2009/10/ebook-economics-are-libraries-
screwed/ [https://perma.cc/N2P5-6RHM]. 
 155. Dorothy R. Auth & Howard Wizenfeld, Avoiding Patent Exhaustion: Structuring 
Agreements in View of the Latest Jurisprudence, The National Law Review (Jan. 5, 2018.), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f4faaaa5-3e25-4539-b0f1-e746b1449945 
[https://perma.cc/2W7E-6Q82]. 
 156. Uetz, supra note 145, at 179. 
 157. “The single-use / no-resale restrictions in [plaintiff’s] contracts with customers may have 
been clear and enforceable under contract law … Because the patentee is exchanging rights, not 
goods, it is free to relinquish only a portion of its bundle of patent protections … The purchasers 
might not comply with the restriction, but the only recourse for the licensee is through contract law, 
just as if the patentee itself sold the item with a restriction.” Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark 
Int’l, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1523, 1531-35 (2017); see also D. Brian Kacedon & Kevin D. Rodkey, The 
Aftermath of Impression Products v. Lexmark, LAW 360 (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.law360. 
com/articles/970183/the-aftermath-of-impression-products-v-lexmark [https://perma.cc/V72K-M 
C6C]. 
 158. This rule is notwithstanding purchasers attempting to make their own copies of the 
patented item. Lexmark, 137 S.Ct. at 1529. 
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agreements.159 Whether these transactions are actually licenses rather than sales 
is frequently the subject of copyright litigation.160 The same principles in this 
copyright litigation can easily be transferred over to patent litigation. Some 
circuit courts have already addressed the issue of licensing intellectual property 
with various legal tests.161  
The Ninth Circuit, Second Circuit, and Federal Circuit have crafted tests to 
determine whether a license agreement regarding intellectual property should 
instead function as a sale.162 The Ninth Circuit applies three main factors: 
whether the owner (1) specifies that the user is granted a license; (2) significantly 
restricts the user’s ability to transfer the software; and (3) imposes notable use 
restrictions.163 In contrast, the Second Circuit shows more deference to the 
buyer’s expectations based on the actions of the parties, using an “economic 
realities” test to determine whether it is more sensible to define the transaction 
as a sale or as a license.164 Finally, the Federal Circuit focuses its attention on 
the restrictions placed upon the user’s rights, rather than any formal title of the 
agreement.165 
Enterprising companies and intellectual property rightsholders are going to 
structure transactional agreements within these rulings to maximize the 
probability that courts define the transaction as a license rather than as a sale.166 
The Ninth Circuit test gives intellectual property rightsholders “magic words” 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 1534-35. 
 161. Tests to determine licensing include “whether the copyright owner specifies that the user 
is granted a license, significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer the software, and imposes 
notable use restrictions.” Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010). The 
Federal Circuit places less importance on formal title of the agreement and more importance on the 
restrictions on the consumer’s rights. DSC Comm. Corp. v. Pulse Comm., Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 
1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The Second Circuit inquires into whether “the party exercises sufficient 
incidents of ownership over a copy of the program to be sensibly considered the owner of the copy.” 
Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 124 (2nd Cir. 2005). 
 162. See Vernor, 621 F.3d 1102; Krause, 402 F.3d at 124; and DSC Comm. Corp., 170 F.3d at 
1362. 
 163. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111-12 (holding that both the original customer and the subsequent 
re-seller of software had violated the terms of the license agreement which recited that Autodesk 
retained all rights of ownership and the customer had only a non-exclusive and non-transferrable 
license). 
 164. Krause, 402 F.3d at 124 (holding that an employer did not violate an employee’s license 
agreement not to modify software code when the code was created for the employer’s sole benefit 
and the employer was allowed to use the code “forever”). 
 165. DSC Comm. Corp., 170 F.3d at 1361-62 (rejecting the argument that all licensees are 
automatically non-owners and instead looking at which particular rights are restricted). 
 166. Of course, more sophisticated buyers and licensees (or anyone situated in a position to 
negotiate the terms of a potential license) can learn from these cases as well. License agreements 
that give buyers more control over rights that resemble ownership, such as transferability and 
indefinite possession, are more likely to be deemed sales than licenses. See id. 
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to contract around restrictions on the scope of their control. Intellectual property 
rightsholders will certainly tuck such language into their transaction agreements, 
safely hidden away from the attention span of the average consumer. If the 
license is more aggressive on the front end of restricting transfer and use, the 
Ninth Circuit test will likely be satisfied. To appease the Second Circuit and the 
Federal Circuit as well, the intellectual property rightsholder should focus more 
attention on the actions of the parties rather than on the terms of the license 
agreement itself. The owner must do more than call the agreement a license: he 
or she must enforce such restrictions so that a reasonable person would believe 
the intellectual property rightsholder still retained ownership rights.167  
There is also debate over the efficiency and use of “click-wrap” licenses, 
and such enforcement is frequently litigated.168 There must be proper notice of 
the license agreement and must otherwise fall into proper fairness.169 The 
enforceability of contracting around the core doctrines of intellectual property 
law is still unclear under current law, but such contracts have typically been 
enforced.170 
While there is still debate over the extent to which intellectual property 
rightsholders can license around intellectual property restrictions, the language 
of these Supreme Court cases171 and other circuit cases makes clear that 
intellectual property rightsholders will have the ability to license, instead of sell, 
their digital goods.172 All of these combined factors mean that companies and 
intellectual property rightsholders will move toward licensing their digitized 
copies to control their works. Intellectual property rightsholders will have to 
consider the impact of licenses if they sell abroad as well.173  
Therefore, based on these cases, sellers of patented or copyrighted products 
and digital content must ask themselves: “Are we going to ‘sell’ this product, or 
are we going to license? If this is a license, what rights will be granted? What 
are the economics of selling the patented product abroad now that international 
exhaustion comes into play?” These are important questions, and often depend 
very heavily on the context of the industry within which the product is sold.  
 
 167. Despite how companies may draft license agreements in practice, the author would argue 
toward more courts adopting the Second Circuit and Federal Circuit tests, as a matter of fairness to 
consumers. 
 168. Among these cases, see generally ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1448-49 (7th 
Cir. 1996); and SCO Group, Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 578 F.3d 1201, 1206 (10th Cir. 2009). For an 
example of the prototypical software license agreement, see Cahoy, supra note 6, at 153. 
 169. Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246, 251, 253 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). 
 170. Rub, supra note 39, at 809. See generally Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 287-89 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (holding that provisions restricting the future transfer of copyrighted goods are 
enforceable under contract law). 
 171. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 133 S.Ct. 1351 (2013); Impression Products, Inc. v. 
Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1523 (2017). 
 172. Greger, supra note 137, at 300. 
 173. Auth & Wizenfeld, supra note 155. 
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C. Which Damages Will Apply: Breach of Contract, or Intellectual Property 
Infringement? 
What is the effect of a consumer purchasing a product covered by 
intellectual property law, then additionally agreeing by contract to more 
restrictions than would have been allowed by either copyright law or patent law? 
Can breach of contract cover remedies and damages that copyright and patent 
infringement cannot?174  
Intellectual Property rightsholders will have to consider their access to 
remedies when the consumer decides to violate the terms of the license 
agreement. If the damages are low enough, the consumer may calculate the risk 
that it is worth re-selling or otherwise violating the terms of the license 
agreement, regardless of contractual restrictions.175 Does failure to follow the 
license constitute breach of contract, or infringement of intellectual property? 
This inquiry is highly fact-sensitive and slight variations in facts may cause 
wildly different damage calculations.176 For a finding of breach of contract, the 
intellectual property rightsholder will typically receive expectation damages.177 
On the other hand, a finding of infringement will cause copyright or patent 
infringement damages to control.178 For patent infringement, the intellectual 
property rightsholder can receive “damages adequate to compensate for the 
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty.”179 Otherwise, the 
patent holder can forgo actual damages and elect to receive the expected value 
of a hypothetical license. In a similar vein, a copyright owner can elect to receive 
either disgorgement of the infringer’s actual profit, or statutory damages.180 The 
 
 174. After the ProCD decision, scholars worried that contract law would “kill” copyright law. 
Guy A. Rub, Copyright Survives: Rethinking the Copyright-Contract Conflict, 103 VA. L. REV. 
1141 (2017) (arguing the effect of contract law on the public domain and copyright law in general 
has remained minimal). 
 175. This idea of contract parties performing a cost-benefit analysis whether to honor their 
contract or pursue more favorable options is commonly referred to as “Efficient Breach Theory.” 
See generally Cahoy, supra note 6, at 136-37. 
 176. Some intellectual property rightsholders may not particularly care which kind of damages 
they are entitled to, as long as they are compensated; however, they should at least be aware that 
this determination will likely require many expensive hours of an attorney’s time and may even 
require litigation in its own right. 
 177. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Damages Rules in 
Intellectual Property Law, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1585, 1587-88 (1998). 
 178. Patent infringement damages are controlled by 35 U.S.C. § 284. Copyright infringement 
damages are controlled by 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2010) (“The copyright owner is entitled to recover 
… any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account 
in computing the actual damages.”). 
 179. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
 180. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2010) (“The copyright owner may elect … to recover, instead of 
actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages … in a sum of not less than $750 or 
more than $30,000 as the court considers just.”). 
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harder question is determining which calculation of damages to choose when 
either breach of contract or intellectual property infringement could be 
applied.181  
First, if the license is exclusive, the only remedy available to the intellectual 
property rightsholder is breach of contract.182 Damages in this case will be 
limited to contract expectation damages.183 Further, the absence of contractual 
privity of any subsequent buyers and sellers means the original intellectual 
property rightsholder will be limited to notoriously difficult claims such as 
tortious interference with contract.184 Possible contractual breaches like this may 
become less of a concern as technology advances to place greater restrictions on 
physical copies and re-sale, but the rightsholders should be aware that damages 
will be limited to breach of contract instead of intellectual property infringement 
and limited causes of action against third parties who purchase downstream.185 
If the license is non-exclusive, different courts may determine the exact 
same violation constitutes either breach of contract or intellectual property 
infringement, depending on the jurisdiction.186 Courts apply a variety of tests to 
determine whether the complaint arises under contract law or federal 
infringement laws, again increasing the uncertainty of enforceability.187 The 
 
 181. See Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer, 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 12.01[A] (2010) 
(The distinction between breach of contract damages and infringement damages is a difficult line 
to draw and “among the knottiest” in intellectual property). Other procedural issues outside the 
scope of this article should still be taken into account, such as awards of attorneys’ fees and 
variations in the statute of limitations. See generally Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of 
Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1477, 1505 (2005). 
 182. Omri Ben-Shahar, Damages for Unlicensed Use, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 10 (2011). 
 183. Under the contract common law, the remedy of expectation damages would serve to ensure 
the non-breaching party is placed in the same position that party would have been if the breach had 
not occurred and the contract had been performed as agreed. When dealing with intellectual 
property license agreements, the damage is likely to be the difference between the original market 
value of outright sale and the price reduction in consideration of the restriction being placed on the 
intellectual property. See Cahoy, supra note 6, at 165. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Daniel Hemel, Trade and Tradeoffs: The Case of International Patent Exhaustion, 116 
COLUM. L. REV. 17, 19 n.8 (2016) (noting that neither of the parties that argued Lexmark before 
the Federal Circuit argued that violations of contractual restrictions placed on licensed patented 
goods would be entitled to anything more than contract remedies rather than patent remedies, and 
that such contracts could not be enforced against third parties). 
 186. Ben-Shahar, supra note 182 at 10-11. 
 187. For treatment on this issue, see James M. McCarthy, Comment, Federal Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction: When Does a Case Involving the Breach of a Copyright Licensing Contract “Arise 
Under” the Copyright Act?, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 165, 175-84 (1993). Some tests include 
whether the dispute is “informed by the substantive law of copyright,” within “the subject matter 
of copyright,” or whether there is “more than an aroma of copyright.” Ben-Shahar, supra note 182 
at 12. 
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fuzzy boundaries created by contracting around intellectual property cause 
difficulty for courts to apply uniform standards.188  
To maximize potential damages and to ensure buyers do not choose efficient 
breach, intellectual property rightsholders will likely incorporate express 
language in the license agreement that will automatically rescind the license 
upon material breach, such as nonpayment. This will allow the intellectual 
property rightsholder to rescind the license and hold the licensee liable for 
infringement for uses thereafter. This method also allows the rightsholder a clear 
path towards arguing for infringement damages, because with no license, 
damages are only recoverable for infringement.189 
Issuing a license and then pulling out the rug from underneath the infringer 
allows the intellectual property rightsholder to have its proverbial cake and eat 
it too. Not only does the license agreement help the rightsholder avoid 
exhaustion; it also keeps open the doors to both breach of contract and 
intellectual property infringement causes of action. There is no doubt that 
intellectual property rightsholders will structure their agreements to allow for 
the maximum damages and other remedies available to them through this 
schema. 
D. Do Consumers Care? 
As explored in previous sections, intellectual property rightsholders can 
avoid the pitfalls of “sales” by attempting to enter license agreements. This 
article predicts that an increasing number of companies will attempt license 
agreements until the courts begin to come down with more affirmative rulings 
on the issue. As demand for digital content continues to grow, will consumers 
care that their rights are restricted? Restrictions need to be placed on the rights 
of consumers for the courts to view license agreements as licenses rather than 
sales, which may lead to unhappy consumers. Even if licenses are legally viable, 
companies may think twice before possibly alienating a sizeable portion of their 
market.  
Further, licensees and downstream buyers will certainly not be happy 
dealing with the uncertainties in this area of law.190 When there is a sale, 
licensees and downstream purchasers know precisely when they are free to use 
re-sale patented inventions and copyrighted works. It may chill the economic 
marketplace when businesses and downstream sellers are unable to predict what 
damages they may face if they are found in either breach of contract or 
 
 188. McCarthy, supra note 187 at 183-84. 
 189. For general tips on how to structure a license agreement to maximize enforceability and 
potential damages, see Auth & Wizenfeld, supra note 155. 
 190. Lorelei Ritchie, Re-evaluating Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction in Intellectual Property 
Disputes, 83 IND. L.J. 957, 975 (2008). 
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intellectual property infringement.191 Intellectual property rightsholders and 
consumers generally benefit from the certainty of knowing how to structure 
license agreements most advantageously toward either party.192 Sellers will 
certainly want to ensure the maximum extent of protection will be enforced, and 
buyers will certainly want to know whether the license agreement they are 
signing can actually be enforced.193 Sellers of intellectual property must take 
care not to alienate a potential customer base by placing onerous restrictions on 
the property rights of their buyers.  
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Kirtsaeng and Lexmark mean that 
intellectual property rightsholders will have to look for alternate methods of 
keeping their products outside of the secondary market. Online transactions are 
becoming more commonplace, increasing the rate at which consumers buy 
goods on the secondary market. 194 Some businesses are built entirely on the 
premise of facilitating all transactions exclusively on secondary marketplace 
goods.195 Because of the secondary market’s rise in prominence and the 
Supreme Court’s rulings to adopt international exhaustion, intellectual property 
rightsholders will also have to look for alternative methods of retaining control 
over intellectual property. Based on current practices, intellectual property 
rightsholders are attempting to retain control through license agreements.196 
There still remains a lack of uniformity regarding how courts interpret 
contractual license provisions that attempt to maneuver around intellectual 
property limitations, so intellectual property rightsholders will have to take care 
to see how courts rule on this issue going forward.197 
 
 191. Javier M. Leija, The Patent Exhaustion Doctrine: Patent Holders’ Rights Versus the 
Public’s Interest in Using the Invention, 2 PHOENIX L. REV. 163, 186 (2009). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Chiappetta, supra note 122, at 1116, 1120 (arguing that intellectual property owners will 
have to offset their prices based on what buyers are willing to pay after their rights are contractually 
restricted). 
 194. Lynda J. Oswald, Statutory and Judicial Approaches to Gray Market Goods: The 
“Material Differences” Standard, 95 KY. L.J. 107, 107-08 (2006-2007). 
 195. Victoria Gomelsky, Watch Brands Confront a Risky Business: The Secondhand Market, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/fashion/watches-resale-maxi 
milian-busser.html [https://perma.cc/N4K6-TZ34] (arguing that secondary markets frequently 
change the dynamics of the gray market). 
 196. “[W]ith increasing alacrity, people agree to terms by clicking away at electronic standard 
forms on websites and while installing software (‘clickwrap’ contracts).” Robert A. Hillman & 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429, 
431 (2002) (noting also that consumers often have no interest in reading or understanding the 
license agreements). 
 197. Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Uniform Rules for Internet Information Transactions: An Overview 
of Proposed UCITA, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 319, 321-23 (2000). 
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Regardless, it appears the demand for doing business digitally is here to stay. 
As an executive said about doing business exclusively on the secondary market: 
“The younger generation … they’re not looking to shop the same way their 
grandparents did.”198 
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